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FACTS 
On March 9 , 1984, t h e P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t ( h e r e i n a f t e r 
"Schul tz") whi le d r i v i n g her v e h i c l e , was s t r u c k from behind 
by a v e h i c l e d r i ven by t h e Defendant/Respondent ( h e r e i n a f t e r 
"Conger") . The v e h i c l e d r iven by Conger has subsequent ly 
been determined t o be owned by S a l t Lake County, a l though 
t h e r e were no markings or o the r i n d i c a t i o n s on t h e v e h i c l e or 
l i c e n s e p l a t e s t o i n d i c a t e such a t t h e t ime of t h e a c c i d e n t 
[Rec. pp . 2 3 , 66] Conger was f u r t h e r dressed in c i v i l i a n 
c l o t h i n g , wi th no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he was an employee of S a l t 
Lake County [Rec. pp . 24 f 66] . Schul tz was no t p laced on 
n o t i c e t h a t Conger was a governmental employee a c t i n g w i t h i n 
t h e scope of h i s employment [ r e c . pp . 2 3 , 24] . 
On March 14, 1984, Schul tz 1 automobile insurance 
c a r r i e r , S t a t e Farm Automobile Insurance Company ( h e r e i n a f t e r 
" S t a t e Farm") f i l e d a Proof of Claim wi th t h e S a l t Lake 
County Board of Commissioners [Rec. pp . 34] . The County 
recognized t h i s c la im and paid in excess of $6,000.00 on t h e 
c la im [Rec. pp . 35] . 
Schul tz gave no o the r n o t i c e [Rec. pp . 67] and f i l e d her 
complaint wi th t h e S a l t Lake County C l e r k ' s o f f i c e on October 
2 3 , 1985 [Rec. pps . 2 through 7 ] . Conger f i l e d a Motion t o 
Dismiss on November 6, 1985 [Rec. p g s . 8-10] , c la iming t h a t 
s ince Schul tz had not f i l e d a s e p a r a t e Not ice of Claim 
pu r suan t t o Utah Code Annota ted , Sec t ion 63-3 0-13 (1953, as 
amended), t h a t t h e S t a t u t e of L i m i t a t i o n s had e x p i r e d . The 
lower Cour t , t h e Honorable Leonard H. Russon, p r e s i d i n g , 
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granted Conger ' s Motion by an Order dated March 1 7 , 1986 
tRec. pgs 6 6 - 6 7 ] . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I 
THE CONDUCT IN THIS CASE IS NOT UNIQUELY GOVERNMENTAL IN 
NATURE AND THUS THERE IS NO IMMUNITY 
II 
I T IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW TO GRANT 
GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES IMMUNITY NOT ENJOYED BY NON-
GOVERNMENTAL 
EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN THE SAME CONDUCT 
I I I 
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
IS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
IV 
FACTUAL ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED WHICH PRECLUDE THE 
GRANTING OF A MOTION TO DISMISS 
V 
THE NOTICE PROVIDED BY STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY 
SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 6 3 -




THE CONDUCT IN THIS CASE IS NOT UNIQUELY GOVERNMENTAL 
IN NATURE AND THUS THERE IS NO IMMUNITY 
The recent decisions of this Court make it clear that 
there is no immunity arising from conduct that is not 
uniquely governmental in its nature. This standard was set 
forth in Standiford v« Salt Lake City Corporation, 605 p.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980) where this Court held that the operation and 
maintenance of a public golf course was not a uniquely 
governmental function and permitted the Plaintiff to proceed 
with her suit* Justice Stewartr writing for the Court, 
stated: 
We therefore hold t h a t the t e s t for determining 
governmental immunity is whether the a c t i v i t y under 
considerat ion i s of such a unique nature t h a t i t can 
only be performed by a governmental agency or tha t i t 
i s e s sen t i a l t o the core of governmental a c t i v i t y . 
Clear ly , t h i s new standard broadens governmental 
l i a b i l i t y * Howeverf the pos i t ion i s cons is ten t 
with the plain l e g i s l a t i v e in t en t in Section 
63-3 0-1 £jt. S£3* t 0 expand governmental l i a b i l i t y 
Final ly f and not the l e a s t of our concerns f the 
standard we adopt today to narrow governmental immunity 
should allow more innocent victims injured by t o r t i o u s 
conduct on the pa r t of public e n t i t i e s access t o the 
cour ts for r ed ress . Fewer such people w i l l be 
merci less ly and sense less ly barred from recovery for 
t h e i r i n ju r i e s sustained a t the hands of the e n t i t i e s 
designed t o serve them. 
605 P.2d a t 1236 through 1237. 
This concept, t h a t the Governmental Immunity Act (Utah 
Code Annotated Section 63-30-1 ££. £££. (1953, as amended)) 
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was not appl icable to non-governmental functions f was 
rei terated in Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dis t r ic t , 
676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984) where the operat ion of a sewage 
plant was held t o be non-governmental in na ture . Jus t i ce 
Howe, wr i t ing for the Court s t a t e d : 
Since the Governmental Immunity Act does not 
purport t o waive immunity for injury or damages caused 
in the exerc ise of a nongovernmental function f i t i t 
obvious t h a t t h i s s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s appl ies only 
to ac t ions brought t o recover for injury or damage 
a r i s i ng from the operat ion of governmental function f 
but where the Act waives immunity from s u i t and per-
mits the ac t ion t o be maintained. 
This d i s t i n c t i o n i s soundly based. Immunity never 
exis ted for i n j u r i e s not a r i s ing from the exercise of a 
governmental function and thus the Act did not purport 
t o waive i t f expressly or impliedly. 
676 P.2d a t 400-401. 
The Court then continued at 4 01 through 4 02: 
In this respect, non-governmental claims are 
similar to equitable claims. In El Rancho Enterprisesf 
Inc. v. Murray City. Utah 565 P.2d 778 (1977) this Court 
following Auerbach Y> Salt Lake Countyr. 23 Utah 103, 63 
P.907 (1901) and Wall v. Salt Lake Cityy 50 Utah 593f 
168 P. 7 66 (197 0) held that where the claims of the 
Plaintiff are for equitable relief, there was not and 
never had been any governmental immunity and the 
requirements of notice of claim imposed by the Govern-
mental Immunity Act did not apply. 
in Cox v, Utah Mortgage & Loan Corporation 716 p.2d 783 
(Utah 1986), this Court held that when the function was non-
governmental (supervision of disbursement from escrowed 
funds) that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act did not apply, 
and notice, as required by Utah Code Annotated Section 63-3 0-
13 (1953, as amended) was not required. 
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In £nx, the . P l a i n t i f f s were allowed to proceed on one 
cause of act ion against a municipality because the 
supervision of the disbursement from escrowed funds was not 
uniquely governmental in na tu re . This was so despi te no 
not ice of claim being given. However, two claims were held 
barred for f a i l u r e to give no t i ce , because the duty to 
maintain and repa i r s t r e e t s was a uniquely governmental 
function. 
Thus, i t i s c lear t ha t no notice i s required where the 
function i s not uniquely governmental in i t s na tu re . See 
also Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corpt, 629 p.2d 432 (Utah 
1981) [providing recrea t iona l oppor tuni t ies i s non-
governmental]; Thomas v. Clearf ie ld City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 
1982) [co l lec t ion and disposal of sewage are non-
governmental]; Madsen v. BorthickP 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) 
[supervision of f inancia l i n s t i t u t i o n s i s governmental]; 
Richards v. Leavi t t f 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985) [maintaining 
s t r e e t s i s governmental]. 
I t i s a l so the law tha t an employee may be immune in 
some c a p a c i t i e s , but not in o the r s . In Doe v. Arguelles r 716 
P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) , a s t a t e employee was absolute ly immune 
while performing discre t ionary funct ions, but was held not t o 
be absolute ly immune while implementing policy which is a 
"nondiscret ionary, adminis ter ia l function". I d . a t 283. 
In t h i s case, i t must be determined whether Conger1 s 
conduct was uniquely governmental in na ture . The conduct in 
which he was engaged was driving a motor veh ic le . Clearly, 
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the operation of an automobile on a public highway is not 
uniquely governmental in i t s nature. Indeed, thousands of 
persons drive vehicles upon the public highways in Salt Lake 
Co unty. 
Even assuming that Conger was within the scope of his 
employment serving subpoenaes, the principal of Doer supraf 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t h i s func t ion of d r i v i n g does no t n e c e s s a r i l y 
f a l l under h i s scope of employment. While s e rv ing papers may 
or may no t be un ique ly governmental / d r i v i n g a ca r i s n o t , 
making Conger l i a b l e under t h e S tand i fo rd and £>fi£. d o c t r i n e s . 
I I 
IT IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
TO GRANT GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES IMMUNITY NOT 
ENJOYED BY NON-EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN THE SAME 
CONDUCT 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y / t h e immunity enjoyed by t h e government in 
t h e performance of governmental a c t i v i t y f did not extend to 
i t s employees. See Frank v. State, 613 P.3d 517 (Utah 1980); 
C o n n e l l V. TQOele C i t y r 5 7 2 P . 2 d 697 ( U t a h 1 9 7 7 ) ; Cornwal l v , 
LajLSSJlf 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977). However, in 1983f the Utah 
Legislature amended 63-3 0-13 of the Governmental Immunity Act 
to grant governmental immunity from suit when acting , f . . • 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment . . . " . 
This Amendment violates Article If Section 2 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, Section I to the 
United States Constitution. Article If Section 2 of the Utah 
Constitution provides that M. . . a l l free governments are 
founded on their authority for their equal protection and 
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benef i t . . . n . The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 t o the 
United S ta t e s Const i tu t ion provides t h a t : "no s t a t e sha l l • • 
deny to any person within i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n the equal 
p ro tec t ion of the laws." These provisions a re viola ted t o 
the extent t h a t an injured party has no redress against a 
governmental employee who i s engaged in the same conduct t h a t 
non-governmental employees engage in , but who enjoy no 
immunity • 
In t h i s case f Conger was driving a veh ic le , an a c t i v i t y 
engaged in by many people who are not governmental employees. 
In the absence of a unique governmental function f t h i s 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n has no j u s t i f i c a t i o n and denies equal 
p ro tec t ion of the law to Schultz . To determine i f the 
c l a s s i f i c t i o n s a t i s f i e s the equal protec t ion c lause , i t must 
be determined t h a t the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n has some ra t iona l 
r e la t ionsh ip t o leg i t imate governmental i n t e r e s t s . U.S. 
Department of Agriculture Yt Morenor 93 s .c t . 282lf 413 U.S. 
528 (1973). The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n here i s so le ly whether the 
t o r t feasor i s a government employee or non-employee. 
A helpful analysis of t h i s issue i s found in Brown v. 
Wichita Sta te Universityr 217 Kan.f 279f 540 P.2d 66 (1975); 
modified on rehearing f 219 Kan. , 2 547 P.2d 1015 (197 6) 
[here inf ter referred t o as Brcwn 1 and Brown 2] . In a 
nu t she l l f the Court, in Brown 1 held in ter a l i a t h a t the 
Governmental Immunity Act was uncons t i tu t iona l r as i t 
v io la ted equal protec t ion and due process . This was 
apparently the f i r s t challenge to l e g i s l a t i v e l y imposed 
- 11 -
immunity in Kansasf the e a r l i e r law on Governmental Immunity 
having been j u d i c i a l l y imposed. On rehearing f the Court, in 
Brown 2, over th ree vigorous d i s s e n t s , ruled t h a t the 
l e g i s l a t u r e could reimpose immunity without v io l a t ing 
cons t i t u t i ona l p ro t ec t ions . The Court held "absent v i o l a t i o n 
of cons t i t u t i ona l r i g h t s , the l e g i s l a t u r e may control 
governmental immunity." 547 P.2d a t 1021. This Court has 
concurred in the reasoning and r e su l t of Brown 2 in Madsen v. 
Borthick f 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983). 
In the present case, only a port ion of the Act i s under 
a t t ack . That por t ion must meet cons t i t u t iona l scrut iny under 
the Brown 2 t e s t . The reasoning of Brown 1 concerning t h a t 
por t ion of the Act i s thus he lpfu l . The Court s t a t e d : 
. . . I t i s d i f f i c u l t for the majority of the Court 
t o see why one governmental agency performing prec i se ly 
the same a c t s . . . should be l i a b l e for negligence and 
o thers should be not [quoting from Carrol l v. K i t t l e f 
203 Kan. 841 457 P.2d 21, 273 . . . 
A person ' s r i g h t t o redress by due course of law 
does not become l e s s worthy of pro tec t ion because he or 
she was injured by a p a r t i c u l a r governmental u n i t . Nor 
does such a person ' s r i g h t t o compensation become any 
the l e s s worthy because of the type of governmental 
un i t involved. Under present Kansas law, no regard i s 
given t o the injury or the f a c t s and circumstances 
surrounding the events which caused the injury - i t i s 
the type of governmental agency and the c t i v i t y which 
i t i s engaged t h a t determines whether the aggrieved 
party w i l l find the doors of the court open or closed. 
Such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s forced and unreal and greater 
burdens are imposed on some than others of the same 
dese r t . We find the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n contained in ESh 
46-901, 902 [Kansas Governmental Immunity Act] a re 
not only "baffl ing" but a r b i t r a r y , discriminatory and 
unreasonable. 
540 P.2d a t 8 1 . 
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In the present case f a person injured by a non-
governmental employee has ce r ta in r i g h t s and redress which a 
person injured by a government employee does not have, so le ly 
based upon t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n , although the injury and fac t s of 
the case are otherwise i d e n t i c a l . Such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
between governmental employees and non-employees engaged in 
the same conduct i s a r t i f i c i a l and discr iminatory. The Brown 
1 Court said t h i s concerning t h a t type of d i s t i n c t i o n : 
The operat ive effect of such a rb i t r a ry d i s -
t i n c t i o n s are incompatible with the cons t i t u t iona l 
safeguards es tabl ished by both the federal and Kansas 
Cons t i tu t ions . I d . a t 8 2. 
The 1983 Amendment t o the Utah Code Annotatedf Section 
63-3 0-13 v i o l a t e s the equal pro tec t ion clause of the s t a t e 
and federal cons t i t u t i ons in t h a t i t gives p re fe ren t i a l 
treatment for the same type of conduct to governmental 
employees and must therefore be s t r i cken . 
In addi t ion f t ha t Amendment v i o l a t e s the equal 
pro tec t ion clauses of the s t a t e and federal cons t i t u t ions in 
another respec t . Utah Code Annotated Section, 31-41-4 (1953f 
as amended) in effect in 1984f when t h i s accident took p lace , 
required every motor vehicle t o have secur i ty in e f fec t . 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-41-5 (1953, as amended) 
provided t h a t the securi ty could be in the form of insurance 
or other method approved by the Utah Insurance Department 
which afforded equivalent securi ty to t h a t offered by 
insurance. Thus, a person injured by the negligence of 
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another dr iver has four years within which to f i l e a claim 
pursuant t o Utah Code Annotated Section, 78-12-25(2) (1953f 
as amended)* However, i f the dr iver i s a government 
employee, the time is reduced t o one year pursuant t o the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, even though both d r ive rs a re 
required by Section 31-41-4 t o have insurance in e f f ec t . 
This denies the injured party equal p ro tec t ion of the law in 
t h a t i t unreasonably d iscr iminates in favor of the 
governmental employee for the same wrong. The wrong i s 
fur ther amplified by the Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-3 0-
29.5 (1953, as amended) which mandates t h a t the insurance 
provided t o cover government owned vehic les n . . . i s deemed 
t o provide the dr iver with the insurance coverage required by 
Chapter 41 T i t l e 31 . . ." even though the employee a t the 
time .of the accident was not driving the vehicle n . . . 
within the course and scope of the d r i v e r ' s employment • • 
. .
w
 This i s so desp i te the fact t h a t the 1983 Amendment t o 
the Utah Code Annotated Section 6 3-3 0-13 only provides 
immunity to an employee act ing " . . . during the performance 
of his du t i e s , within the scope of employment . . . . w Thus, 
an injured party has a four-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s 
agains t a government employee not within the scope of 
employment when driving a veh ic le , but only a one-year 
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n i f the same employee, dr iving the same 
veh ic l e , negl igent ly causes the accident while within the 
scope of employment,. This i s so despi te the fact t h a t 
i den t i ca l insurance coverage, as required by law, is in 
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effect. Such classification has no rational basis to a 
legitimate governmental interest and is "arbitrary, 
discriminatory and unreasonable" and must be held 
unconstitutional. 
Ill 
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT IS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
A r t i c l e I f S e c t i o n 7 of t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e s : 
"No person s h a l l be depr ived of l i f e , l i b e r t y or p rope r ty 
wi thout due p r o c e s s of l aw." The F i f t h Amendment t o t h e 
United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n r e a d s : "No person s h a l l be . . . 
depr ived of l i f e , l i b e r t y or proper ty wi thou t due p r o c e s s of 
l aw." The Four t een th Amendment/ Sec t ion 1 t o t h e United 
S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e s : "Nor s h a l l any s t a t e depr ive any 
person of l i f e f l i b e r t y or p roper ty wi thout due p roces s of 
law . . . . " 
These C o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s r e q u i r e n o t i c e and a 
hea r ing before t h e Government can depr ive a person of a 
property r ight , in Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Company, 
78 Utah 39 , 300 P. 1040 (1931)
 f this Court held that a cause 
of action is a property right protected by the Constitution. 
In that casef a cause of action arose under the Blue Sky laws 
in effect at that time. Howeverf prior to bringing suit, the 
law was changed/ destroying that cause of action. The Court 
held: 
. . .her right of action was nevertheless within 
the protection of the Constitution and could not be 
destroyed by legislation. . . It is a vested rightf in 
the nature of a property rightf and ought to be regarded 
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as property in the sense that tangible things are 
property and equally protected by the Constitution 
against arbitrary interference by the Legislature. 
300 P. 1045 
In t h i s c a s e , Schu l t z became v e s t e d w i t h a c a u s e of 
a c t i o n a g a i n s t Conger when he n e g l i g e n t l y caused h i s v e h i c l e 
t o c o l l i d e w i t h her v e h i c l e * He was d r i v i n g an unmarked c a r 
t h a t had no i n d i c a t i o n on i t f nor on t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e s f t h a t 
i t was owned by t h e government. Conger was n o t i n any t y p e 
of uniform or c l o t h i n g t h a t would i n d i c a t e he was a 
government employee . Absent n o t i c e of government 
i n v o l v e m e n t , S c h u l t z had a f o u r - y e a r s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s 
w i t h i n which t o br ing her s u i t f pursuant t o Utah Code 
Annotated S e c t i o n 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 (2) (1953 , a s amended). The 
l e g i s l a t u r e cannot a l t e r t h a t r i g h t v i a t h e Governmental 
Immunity Act when S c h u l t z had no i n d i c a t i o n whatsoever t h a t 
Conger was a governmental employee . In Brown l f .siipiLar the 
Court s t a t e d : 
To say t h a t t h e governmental immunity s t a t u t e s i n 
q u e s t i o n s u b v e r t t h e c o n c e p t of due p r o c e s s , i s but t o 
s t a t e t h e o b v i o u s f o r t h a t d o c t r i n e b l o c k s a c c e s s t o 
our c o u r t s t o t h o s e s e e k i n g r e d r e s s f o r i n j u r i e s 
o c c a s i o n e d by t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t of a governmental 
e n t i t y . 
540 P.2d a t 8 2 . 
The Governmental Immunity A c t , a s a p p l i e d t o t h e f a c t s 
of t h i s c a s e where no n o t i c e i s a v a i l a b l e and a t o r t - f e a s o r 
i s a governmental employee , i s a v i o l a t i o n of due p r o c e s s . 
S c h u l t z i s , t h e r e f o r e , e n t i t l e d t o her day i n Court . 
IV 
FACTUAL ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED WHICH PRE-
CLUDE THE GRANTING OF A MOTION TO DISMISS 
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Conger brought his Motion t o Dismiss pursuant to the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and Rule 1 2 ( D ) (1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civ i l Procedure f claiming the Court had no subject 
matter j u r i s d i c t i o n over the controversy. The subject matter 
of j u r i s d i c t i o n was not argued t o the lower Court, Conger 
instead relying on the Notice provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 63-30-13 (1983 amendment). In order to 
qualify for immunity under t ha t Section f Conger must be 
within the scope of his employment. See Foster v. Sal t Lake 
County, 712 P.2d 224f 227 (Utah 1985). Whether or not he i s 
within t h a t scope are factual i ssues which Schultz i s 
e n t i t l e d to discover before having her claim dismissed. 
The c loses t thing t h i s Court has t o come to determining 
t h a t issue i s a review of cases in te rp re t ing Rule 12(b) (6) , 
which motion t o dismiss has been t rea ted as a Motion for 
summary udgment, as the Rule permits . In Holbrook Company v. 
Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) t h i s Court held t h a t a motion 
t o dismiss cannot be granted when factual i ssues remain. The 
Court s t a t ed : 
Conversely, if there i s any dispute as to any 
issue material t o the set t lement of the controversy, 
the Summary Judgment should not be granted. 
542 P.2d a t 193. 
In this case, as in Holbrookf Conger has presented 
affidavits outside the scope of the pleadings themselves 
(Complaint and Motion to Dismiss) which extraneous documents 
appear to deal with Rule 12(b) (6) matters rather than 
12(b) (1) matters. Because factual issues are unresolved, 
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Conger i s no t e n t i t l e d t o a d i s m i s s a l . See a l s o Harvey v . 
SandfijLSf 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975) and Lind v , Lynch/ 665 p.2d 
1276 (Utah 1983) • 
V 
THE NOTICE PROVIDED BY STATE FARM INSURANCE 
COMPANY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 6 3-3 0-13 (1953 f 
AS AMENDED) 
This Court has had t h e oppor tun i ty t o review t h e purpose 
of t h e Not ice requi rement of Utah Code Annotated S e c t i o n s 6 3 -
30-13 (1953, a s amended) in Sears v . Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 
(Utah 197 7) • In f^iSJLSf t h i s Court i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e purpose 
of t h e Not ice requi rement i s t o give t h e a f f e c t e d 
governmental e n t i t y t h e oppor tun i ty t o promptly i n v e s t i g a t e 
t h e c la im and t o minimize any changes t h a t may occur in an 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
These purposes have been met in t h e i n s t a n t case when 
S t a t e Farmf S c h u l t z ' s insurance c a r r i e r , provided n o t i c e t o 
S a l t Lake County, The County had t h e oppor tun i ty t o 
i n v e s t i g a t e t h e c la im and a p p a r e n t l y f e l t i t was v a l i d , a s i t 
pa id Six Thousand S i x t e e n D o l l a r s and 69/100 ($6,016.69) a s a 
c la im a r i s i n g from t h i s a c c i d e n t . Since t h e purpose of t h e 
Not ice requi rement was met f t h e r e was no need fo r Schul tz t o 
f i l e a d u p l i c a t e no t i ce* Having r ece ived a w r i t t e n n o t i c e 
and made payments t he reon f t h e County and Conger a r e in no 
p o s i t i o n t o argue l ack of n o t i c e . 
CONCLUSION 
The T r i a l Court was in e r r o r in s e v e r a l r e s p e c t s in 
g r a n t i n g Conger ' s Motion t o Dismiss , Conger was not involved 
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in a governmental activity that was uniquely governmental in 
i t s nature so as to grant him immunity• The equal protection 
and due process clauses of the United States and Utah State 
Constitutions have been violated as the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act has been applied to the facts of this case* 
There are factual issues which preclude a dismissal in this 
case. The purpose of the Notice requirement has been met so 
that Schultz was not required to file a duplicate notice. 
For these reasons, the decision of the lower Court must 
be reversed and the case remanded for tr ial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this / ^ d a y of October
 f 1986. 
JHN SPENCER SNOW 
S^HALLIDAY 
At to rneys fo r Appe l l an t 
*&. Jt&IOR BAKER 
SNOW & HALLIDAY 
At to rneys fo r Appe l l an t 
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I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I mailed four (4) c o p i e s of t h e 
foregoing A p p e l l a n t ' s Br ief f postage p r e p a i d , t h i s i i ^ F d a y 
of October , 1986 f t o : 
P a t r i c i a J . Marlowr Esq. 
Deputy County Attorney 
Office of t h e S a l t Lake County At torney 
231 Eas t 400 South 
- 19 -




T.J. "TED" CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: LOUIS E. MIDGLEY (2256) 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
... • - 11.1. II i • 1 . . . . II. 1 •• • • 
LE ANN R. SCH.ULTZ, 
plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
WELDON CONGER, ] 
Defendant. 
I ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C-85-71&3 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss having come on regularly 
for hearing on the 24th day of February, 1986, before the 
undersigned, and L. E. Midgley, Esq., appearing in behalf of 
defendants and John Spencer Snow, Esq., appearing in behalf of 
the plaintiff, and arguments of counsel having been heard and 
the memoranda submitted by the parties having heretofor been 
reviewed by the Court, and the Court having found that the 
defendant Conger at the time of the accident in question which 
occurred on March 9, 1984, was employed as a deputy sheriff 
without uniform for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office and 
was driving an unmarked vehicle registered to Salt Lake County-
- i -
that the plaintiff failed to file a Notice of Claim as 
provided under the provisions of 63-30-11 (2) (3) U.C.A, 
within the time prescribed by said statute; that the notice 
filed by the plaintiff's insurance company was insufficient; 
and that the Complaint filed herein was filed after the 
statute of limitations had expired under the provisions of 
t'he Governmental Immunity Act; and the Court having found that 
the defendants1 Motion to Dismiss should be granted. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that plaintiff's Complaint be and the same is herewith 
dismissed with prejudice,., 
DATED this / / ^ j ) day of /?^?^^t^L 1986. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Y<r&-> 
.^m\ SPENCER SNOW 
A t t o r n e y / f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
BY THE COURT: 
^ .LXTy^v^JzA 
LEONARD H. RUSSON,-Dis t r ic t jQtfge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Cterk 
Deputy Qjcr* 
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CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES AMEND. XIV, § 5 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of ally State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
21 
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ART. I, §2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments 
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, 
and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public 
welfare may require. 
tion of smoke or other* air pollution, 78 
A. L. B. 2d 1324. 
Aliens, restricting right to bear weap-
ons, 34 A. L. B. 63. 
Aliens, statute precluding from acting 
as guardians, 39 A. L. B. 943. 
Arbitration: violation of equal protec-
tion of the laws by arbitration statutes, 
55 A. L. R. 2d 445. 
Beauty shops: equal protection of the 
law as denied by statute or ordinance 
regulating beauty shops or beauty culture 
schools, 56 A. L. B, 2d 886. 
Blue sky laws, constitutionality, 87 A. 
L. B. 42, subdiv. VIII superseded 163 A. 
L. B. 1050. 
Burial: equal protection of the laws as 
violated by statute regulating pre-need 
contracts for the sale or furnishing of 
burial services and merchandise, 68 A. L. 
B. 2d 1251. 
Burial: equal protection under statute, 
ordinance, or other regulation in relation 
to funeral directors and embalmers, 89 
A. L. B. 2d 1351. 
Cemeteries: public prohibition or regu-
lation of location of cemetery as violation 
of equal protection of the laws, 50 A. L. 
B. 2d 918, 921. 
Censorship laws, validity, 64 A. L, R. 
505. 
Charitable trust property, violation of 
equal protection of law by legislation 
authorizing sale of, 40 A. L. B. 2d 573. 
Contributory negligence, statute abol-
ishing or modifying rule in certain class 
of cases or situations, as denial of equal 
protection of the laws, 142 A. L. B. 631. 
Corrupt practices acts, constitutionality, 
69 A. L. B. 377. 
Debt adjusting, equal protection of the 
laws as violated by legislation regulating 
or forbidding business of, 95 A. L. B. 2d 
1355. 
Dogs, equal protection of law as vio-
lated by statute or ordinance providing 
for destruction of, 56 A. L. B. 2d 1044. 
Fair trade law: equal protection of the 
laws under state "fair trade" law as ap-
plied to nonsigning reseller, 19 A. L. B. 
2d 1139. 
Fair trade law: validity, under equal 
protection of the laws guaranty of state 
constitution, of nonsigner provision of, 
60 A. L. B. 2d 444. 
Financial responsibility act as violative 
of equal protection of the laws, 35 A. L. 
B. 2d 1013. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 2. 
Motorcycle helmet law. 
Statute which requires any person rid-
ing a motorcycle on a public highway to 
wear a crash helmet is not violative of 
equal protection. State v. Acker, — U. 
(2d) —, 485 P. 2d 1038. 
Qualifications of signers of petition. 
Provisions of the Water Conservancy 
Act precluding owners of property whose 
assessed valuation is less than $300 from 
acting on petitions either for or against 
a proposed conservancy district do not 
violate this section. Patterick v. Carbon 
Water Conservancy Dist., 106 U. 55, 145 
P. 2d 503. 
Residence requirements for voting. 
Former provision, denying the franchise 
to residents of Indian reservations, was 
not in conflict with this clause. Alan v. 
Merrell, 6 U. (2d) 32, 305 P. 2d 490. 
Unemployment benefits. 
Statute denying unemployment benefits 
to student attending established school but 
granting them to those attending night 
school was not constitutionally discrimina-
tory. Norton v. Department of Employ-
ment Security, 22 U. (2d) 24, 447 P. 2d 
907. 
Wage payment law. 
Law imposing penalties on employers 
for failure to pay wages due separated em-
ployees within 24 hours from demand 
therefor is unconstitutional because the 
classification excluding banks and mer-
cantile houses from the penalty provision 
is arbitrary and has no reasonable justifi-
cation in fact. Justice v. Standard Gilson-
ite Co., 12 U. (2d) 357, 366 P. 2d 974. 
Collateral References. 
Constitutional Law<£»91j Elections«§=»l. 
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§3, 214; 
29 C.J.S. Elections § 1. 
16 Am. Jur. 2d 180, Constitutional Law 
§2. 
Accountant, equal protection of the 
laws in regulation of, 70 A. L. B. 2d 437. 
Air pollution: discriminatory legisla-
tion; equal protection of laws; special 
or class legislation as violated by regula-
134 
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ART. I, § 7 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Gun control laws, validity and construc-
tion of, 28 A. L. R. 3d 845. 
Law Reviews. 
The Constitutional Right to Keep and 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of li 
process of law. 
Comparable Provision, 
Montana Const., Art. H I , §27. 
Cross-Reference. 
Eminent domain generally, 78-34-1 et 
seq. 
In general. 
"Due process of law" comes to us from 
the Great Charter and is synonymous with 
"law of the land." I t means that a par ty 
shall have his day in court—trial. Jensen 
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 6 U. 253, 21 P . 994, 
4 L. R. A. 724. 
Due process of law is not necessarily 
judicial process. People v. Hasbrouck, 11 
U. 291, 39 P . 918. 
Judgment against defendant, not served 
with process and not appearing either in 
person or by attorney, would not be due 
process of law. Blyth & Fargo Co. v. 
Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P . 1027. 
I t is elementary that there can be no 
judicial action affecting vested rights that 
is not based upon some process or notice 
whereby the interested parties are brought 
within the jurisdiction of the judicial 
tribunal about to render judgment. Parry 
v. Bonneville I r r . Dist., 71 U. 202, 263 P . 
751. 
"Due process of law" requires that , be-
fore one can be bound by a judgment 
affecting his property rights, some process 
must be served upon him which in some 
degree at least is calculated to give him 
notice. Naisbit t v. Herrick, 76 U. 575, 
290 P . 950. 
Due process of law requires that notice 
be given to the persons whose rights are 
to be affected. I t hears before i t con-
demns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after trial. Riggins v. Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U. 
183, 51 P . 2d 645. 
The phrase "due process of law" appar-
ently originated with Lord Coke, who de-
fined the terms. Many attempts have been 
made to further define due process of law, 
but all of them resolve into the thought 
that a par ty shall have his day in court. 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P . 
2d 314. 
In depriving a person of life or lib-
erty, the essentials of due process are: 
(a) the existence of a competent person, 
Bear Arms, Lucilius A. Emery, 28 Harv. 
L. Rev. 473. 
Restrictions on the Right To Bear Arms 
—State and Federal Firearms Legislation, 
98 U. Pa . L. Rev. 905. 
i, liberty or property, without due 
body, or agency authorized by law to de-
termine the questionsj (b) an inquiry 
into the merits of the question by such 
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the 
person of the inauguration and purpose 
of the inquiry and the time at which 
such person should appear if he wishes 
to be heard; (d) right to appear in per-
son or by counsel; (e) fair opportunity 
to submit evidence, examine and cross-
examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be 
rendered upon the record thus made. In 
the absence of s tatute laying down other 
or more specific requirements, the above 
conditions meet the demands of due 
process. In the absence of specific pro-
visions to the contrary, due process does 
not require that any or all of these 
requirements must be in writ ing or in 
any particular form. In the interests of 
orderly procedure and certainty as to its 
proceedings and action taken, any legally-
constituted body or agency should as far 
as practical have wri t ten records of all 
proceedings before it , except where other-
wise provided by law. Christiansen v. 
Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P . 2d 314. 
In the t r ia l of criminal cases the stat-
utes prescribe certain rules of procedure, 
which must be substantially complied with 
to keep the proceedings within the due 
processes of the law. A somewhat dif-
ferent set of rules is prescribed in civil 
cases and in special proceedings. Some 
rules, affecting all types, are not found in 
the statutes, but in tha t great basic body 
of the law commonly known as the deci-
sions or rules of the courts. But all these 
methods and means provided for the pro-
tection and enforcement of human rights 
have the same basic requirements—that 
no party can be affected by such action, 
until his legal rights have been the sub-
ject of an inquiry by a person or body 
authorized by law to determine such 
rights, of which inquiry the par ty has due 
notice, and a t which he had an opportu-
ni ty to be heard and to give evidence as 
to his rights or defenses. Christiansen v. 
Harris , 109 U. 1, 163 P . 2d 314. 
While normally we think of "due proc-
ess of law" as requiring judicial action, 
yet "due process" is not necessarily judi-
cial action. Christiansen v. Harris, 109 
U. 1, 163 P . 2d 314. 
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AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 31-41-5 
31-41-4. Requirement for maintenance of security by residents, non-
residents, state of Utah and political subdivisions, United States, and other 
states or political subdivisions.—(1) Every resident owner of a motor 
vehicle shall maintain the security provided for in section 31-41-5 in effect 
continuously throughout the registration period of the motor vehicle. 
(2) Every nonresident owner of a motor vehicle which has been 
physically present in this state for more than ninety days during the pre-
ceding 365 days shall thereafter maintain the security provided for in 
section 31-41-5 in effect continuously throughout the period the motor 
vehicle remains within this state. 
(3) The state of Utah and all of its political subdivisions and their 
respective departments, institutions, or agencies shall maintain in effect 
continuously in respect to their motor vehicles the security provided for in 
section 31-41-5. 
(4) The United States and any other state, or any political subdivi-
sions of same, or any of their agencies, may maintain in effect in respect 
to their motor vehicles the security provided for in section 31-41-5. 
History: L. 1973, eh. 55, § 4. 7 Am. Jur. 2d 297, Automobile Insur-
Cross-Reference. ance § 4. 
Safety Responsibility Act, security re- Validity and construction of "no-fault" 
quired, 41-12-5. automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. R. 3d 
229. 
CoUateral References. Validity of Motor Vehicle Financial Re-
AutomobilesC=>144.1(4). sponsibihty Act, 35 A. L. R. 2d 1011. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 110. 
31-41-5. Insurance or other security authorized—Insurance coverages 
greater than required minimum allowed.—(1) The security required by 
this act shall be provided in one of the following methods: 
(a) Security by insurance may be provided with respect to each 
motor vehicle by an insurance policy that qualifies under chapter 12 of 
Title 41 (the Safety Responsibility Act), except as modified to provide the 
benefits and exemptions provided for in this act, and has been approved 
by the department; or 
(b) Security may be provided with respect to any motor vehicle by 
any other method approved by the department as affording security equiva-
lent to that offered by a policy of insurance provided such security is 
continuously n aintained throughout the motor vehicle's registration period. 
The person providing this type of security shall have all of the obliga-
tions and rights of an insurer under this act 
(2) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prohibit the 
issuance of policies of insurance providing coverages greater than the 
minimum coverages required under this act nor to require the segregation 
of such minimum coverages from other coverages in the same policy. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 5. Validity and construction of "no-fault" 
_ .. . «. . automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. R. 
CoUateral References. 33 229. 
Automobiles<3=43. Validity of Motor Vehicle Financial 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 113. Responsibility Act, 35 A. L. R. 2d 1011. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 297, Automobile Insur-
ance § 5. 
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63-30-13 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
The 1983 amendment inserted "or its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority"; substituted "claim arises" for 
"cause of action arises"; and added "or before 
the expiration of any extension of time 
granted under subsection 63-30-11(4)." 
Action based on exercise of governmental 
function. 
Action against state which was predicated 
on governmental supervision of financial 
institutions involved the exercise of a govern-
mental function and was barred where there 
was no compliance with the notice of claim 
provisions of 63-30-11 and 63-30-12. Madsen 
v. Borthick (1983) 658 P 2d 627. 
Compliance with section, 
Plaintiffs complied with this section 
where, within a year after the cause of action 
arose, they filed notice of claim with the 
attorney general and the agency concerned 
on the same day they filed the original com-
plaint with the court, and amended com-
plaint alleging compliance with the 
Governmental Immunity Act was filed, as a 
matter of right, within one year after denial 
of the claim or after the end of the 90-day 
period in which the claim is deemed to have 
been denied. Johnson v. Utah State Retire-
ment Office (1980) 621 P 2d 1234. 
Quiet title actions. 
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies 
with this section if it is given not more than 
one year after plaintiffs right to possession 
has been disturbed or encroached upon by 
the state. Ash v. State (1977) 572 P 2d 1374. 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee *~ Time for fil-
ing notice. A claim against a political subdivision or against its employee for an 
act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under subsection 
63-30-11(4). 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch. 
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment rewrote this section-
For prior version, see parent volume. 
The 1983 amendment inserted "or against 
its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority" substituted "claim arises" for 
"cause of action arises"; and added "or before 
the expiration of any extension of time 
granted under subsection 63-30-11(4)." 
Claims barred. 
Trial court properly dismissed complaint 
against county where notice of the claim was 
not filed with the county commission during 
the year following plaintiffs discovery of her 
injuries. Yates v. Vernal Family Health Cen-
ter (1980) 617 P 2d 352. 
Claims by minors. 
Failure of a minor to give notice within the 
time provided in this section does not bar the 
minor's claim as the time for notice is tolled 
during minority by 78-12-36. Scott v. School 
Board of Granite School Dist. (1977) 568 P 2d 
746. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time for filing action 
against governmental entity. If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an 
action in the district court against the governmental entity [m those circumstances 
m which immunity from stttfc haa beet* waived m this chapter] or an employee of 
the entity. The action must be commenced within one year after denial or the 
denial period as specified in this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1983, ch. 
129, § 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1983 amendment substituted "in this 
chapter" for "as in this act provided" in the 
first sentence and for "herein" in the second 
sentence; and made minor changes in phrase-
ology. 
Amended complaint. 
Plaintiffs complied with this section 
where, within a year after the cause of action 
arose, they filed notice of claim with the 
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63-30-29 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
said trust fund shall be subject to investment pursuant to Chapter 7, Title 51, the 
State Money Management Act of 1974, [51-7-1 to 51-7-2] and shalToe subject to 
audit by the state auditor. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust 
agreement between the governmental entity and the trustee may authorize the 
trustee to employ counsel to defend actions against the entity and its employees 
and to protect and safeguard the assets of the trust, to provide for claims investiga-
tion and adjustment services, to employ expert witnesses and consultants, and to 
provide such other services and functions necessary and proper to carry out the 
purposes of the trust. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §28; 1978, ch. 
27, §9; 1979, ch. 94, §1; 1983, ch. 130, §1; 
1985, ch. 21, § 32. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment substituted "or self-
insure against any risk created by this act" 
for "against any risk which may arise as a 
result of the application of this act" in the 
first paragraph, and made a minor change in 
phraseology. 
The 1979 amendment inserted "commer-
cial" in the first paragraph; added "or by 
sections 63-48-1 through 63-48-7" to the first 
paragraph; and added the second paragraph. 
The 1983 amendment rewrote the first par-
agraph which read: "Any governmental 
entity within the state may purchase com-
mercial insurance or self-insure against any 
risk created by this act or by sections 63-48-1 
through 63-48-7"; inserted "In addition to 
any other reasonable means of self-insur-
ance" at the beginning of the second para-
graph; deleted "supported in whole or in part 
from federal sources" after "a governmental 
entity" in the first sentence of the second 
paragraph; deleted "in accordance with 
applicable federal regulations" before "by 
establishing" in the first sentence of the sec-
ond paragraph; and inserted the citation 
after "State Money Management Act" in the 
second sentence of the second paragraph. 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 12 of Laws 1978, ch. 27 provided: 
"Sections 63-30-21 and 63-30-30, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 139, 
Laws of Utah 1965, section 10-7-77, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
10, Laws of Utah 1973, and section 10-7-78, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, are repealed." 
Right to hire legal counsel. 
This section provides University of Utah 
Hospital with authority to hire independent 
legal counsel; this section does not violate 
attorney general's authority under Art. VII, 
§ 16 of the state constitution and provides an 
exception to the general authority of the 
attorney general to perform legal services for 
any agency of state government. Hansen v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd. (1982) 652 P 2d 
1332. 
Law Reviews. 
Utah Legislative Survey - 1979,1980 Utah 
L. Rev. 155. 
63-30-29. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 63-30-29 (L. 1965, ch. 139, §29; 
1978, ch. 27, § 10), relating to provisions of 
liability insurance policies, was repealed by 
Laws 1983, ch. 130, §5. 
63-30-29.5. Liability insurance — Government vehicles operated by employ-
ees outside scope of employment. A governmental entity that owns vehicles 
driven by employees of the governmental entity with the express or implied consent 
of the entity, but which, at the time liability is incurred as a result of an automo-
bile accident, is not being driven and used within the course and scope of the 
driver's employment is deemed to provide the driver with the insurance coverage 
required by Chapter 41, Title 31, and is deemed to provide liability coverage by 
the governmental entity in accordance with the requirements of the Safety Respon-
sibility Act (section 41-12-1 et seq.). In no event, however, shall the limits of the 
liability coverage provided under this subsection be deemed to exceed the minimum 
bodily injury and property limits specified in section 41-12-5. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-29.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 128, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Chapter 41, Title 31, referred to in this sec-
tion, was repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 242, § 58, 
effective July 1,1986. 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-25 
What constitutes a promise in writing When statute begins to run in favor of 
to pay money within statutes of limita- drawer of check, 4 A. L. B. 881. 
tion, 111 A. L. B. 984. When statute commences to run against 
When does limitation commence to run action for breach of covenant, 99 A. L. B. 
against action, defense, or counterclaim 1050. 
based on usury, 108 A. L. B. 622. When statute of limitations begins to 
When does limitation or laches com- run against action on a contract which 
mence to run against suit to reform an contemplates an actual demand, 159 A. L. 
instrument, 106 A. L. B. 1338. B. 1021. 
When statute begins to run against ac- When statute of limitations commences 
tion to recover interest, 36 A. L. B. 1085. to run against action based on fraud in 
When statute begins to run against note construction, repair, or equipment of build-
payable on demand, 71 A. L. B. 2d 284. ™S> 1 5 0 A. L. B. 778. 
DECISIONS UNDEB FOBMEB LAW 
War risk insurance. until 1931, and suit was not brought until 
Action to recover automatic insurance 1932» m o r e than s i x v e a r s a f t e r accrual 
benefits on war risk insurance which ac- of action. United States v. Preece, 85 F. 
crued in 1917 was barred by this statute, 2d 952. 
where claim was not presented to bureau 
78-12-24. Public officers—Within six years.—An action by the state or 
any agency or public corporation thereof against any public officer for 
malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or against any surety 
upon his official bond may be brought within six years after such officer 
ceases to hold his office, but not thereafter. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §82 
Supp., 104-12-24. et seq. 
Compiler's Notes. Bunning of limitation as to action by 
This section is identical to former sec- P ^ l i c ^ o d v ffains* ° * c e ! o r employee as 
tion 104-2-48 (Code 1943) which was re- deferred until defendant ceases to be 
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, §3. ° ? c f o r employee, or until the end of 
° his term of office or employment, 137 A. L. 
Cross-Reference. B. 674. 
Bunning of statute of limitations as 
Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1 et
 affectcd by uncertainty as to existence of se(l* a cause of action because of delay in 
settling or determining a matter of gen-
Collateral Beferences.
 e r a j o r governmental concern upon which 
Limitation of Actions<§=>58(2). itr depends, 135 A. L. B. 1339. 
78-12-25. Within four years,—Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded 
upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares 
and merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; also 
on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials 
furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be 
commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is maHe 
or the last payment is received. 
(2) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, cal to former section 104-2-23 (Code 1943) 
Supp., 104-12-25. which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, 
„ , , , _ _ . § 3. Subdivision (2) is similar to former 
Compilers Notes. section 104-2-30 (Code 1943) which also 
Subdivision (1) of this section is identi- was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
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PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS Rule 12(b) 
Agency, manner and sufficiency of Propriety of entering summary judg-
pleading in contract action, 45 A. L. R. ment for plaintiff before defendant files 
2d 583. or serves answer to complaint or petition, 
Last clear chance doctrine, raising is- 85 A. L. R. 2d 825. 
sue of, in reply, 25 A. L. R. 2d 277. 
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief 
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) 
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join 
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be 
made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or 
objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or 
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after 
the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for 
relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that 
claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to 
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56. 
Compiler's Notes. spired to harass, annoy, threaten and in-
This Rule is identical to Fed. Rule 12(b) timidate plaintiff until it was necessary 
as it existed prior to 1966, except for the for i t to discontinue business failed to 
addition of the phrase "or by further state claim on which relief could be 
pleading after the denial of such motion granted, as required under Rule 8(a ) , so 
or objection" at the end of the third sen- that defendants' motion to dismiss should 
tence. have been granted. Utah Steel & Iron 
Co. v. Bosch, 25 U. (2d) 85, 475 P . 2d 
Failure to state a claim upon which relief 1019. 
can be granted. Action against city for breach of im-
A motion to dismiss should not be plied contract was properly dismissed for 
granted unless i t appears to a certainty failure to state claim upon which relief 
that the plaintiff would be entitled to no could be granted, since the contract to 
relief under any state of facts which could review bids on an equal basis was too 
be proved in support of his claim. Liquor nebulous to be enforceable, and the city 
Control Comm. v. Athas, 121 U. 457, 243 is immune to tort action for deceit. Rapp 
P. 2d 441. v. Salt Lake City, 527 P . 2d 651. 
Complaint alleging false, deceptive or I t only takes one sworn statement to 
misleading advertising and misrepresenta- dispute averments on other side of con-
tion of guarantee was improperly dis- troversy and create issue of fact, preclud-
missed, under this section, since under ing summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. 
circumstances trial court could not con- Adams, 542 P. 2d 191. 
elude "with certainty" that plaintiff would 
be entitled to no relief under any state of General and special appearances. 
facts which could be proved in support The language in this Rule stat ing that 
of such claim. Christensen v. Lelis Auto- " [n ]o defense or objection is waived by 
matic Transmission Service, Inc., 24 U. being joined with one or more other de-
(2d) 165, 467 P . 2d 605. fenses or objections in a responsive plead-
Complaint alleging that defendants con- ing or motion or by further pleading after 
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